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The Determinants of Pay Settlements. The Influence of the National 
Context 
 
 
This article studies the influence of national context and collective bargaining on the factors 
taken into account when adjusting wages. Using data from Spanish and British manufacturing 
establishments, we examine the relative importance of the cost of living, the ability to recruit or 
retain employees, the financial performance of the organisation and the industrial relations 
climate on wage adjustments of manual workers at the establishment level. Our findings show 
that there are significant differences on the importance given to these factors in both countries. 
In part, these are related to differences in the incidence of collective bargaining. 
 
Keywords: collective bargaining, pay settlements, national context, wage adjustments, 
compensation 
 
Introduction 
 
The design of compensation systems in organisations is a topic that has been extensively 
studied in the literature. The relevance of studying compensation issues from an 
organisation-level point of view rests on the fact that they constitute a key component of 
the employment contract. Pay design is a complex issue, which is the result of different 
influences. Wages are not only determined by the forces of the labour market, as the 
competitive model predicts (see Bryson and Forth, 2008). Bargaining processes between 
employees and employers, no matter at which level take place, also influence wage 
levels. The institutions of the labour market and the political decisions adopted by 
governments shape the rewarding practices of firms as well. Moreover, employers 
participate in the process of pay determination and use payment policies as a valuable 
tool for managing the workforce.  
Wages are reviewed when changes in the terms of the employment relationship occur, 
and employers’ pay adjustments are also constrained by various influences such as the 
country’s legislation and institutions, the conditions of the labour market or the 
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negotiation processes with employees’ representatives. Pay reviews are not only 
complex, but also costly for employers. This implies that, instead of being designed on 
an individual basis, they are frequently carried out with a certain periodicity, embracing 
groups of workers. This type of wage adjustments, known as pay settlements in the 
terminology of collective bargaining, is the centre of our analysis.  
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on pay settlements taking a, somehow, 
different approach to the issue than the one adopted in the previous literature. We do not 
simply focus on determining what the factors that influence wage adjustments are. In 
fact, our main objective is to study the impact that the national context has on pay 
settlements. In order to do so, we examine how national institutions bear upon the 
importance given to some specific factors when wages are adjusted. Special attention is 
paid to collective bargaining as an institution that plays a major role in wage 
determination (see Bosch, 2009; and Grimshaw, 2009). 
Numerous empirical studies have focused on analysing the influence of institutions on 
practices such as direct communication (see Croucher et al., 2006), employee voice (see 
Brewster, 2007) or financial participation (see Croucher et al., 2010), among others. 
Drawing on this literature, our aim is to study the impact of the national context on the 
factors that employers take into account when adjusting wages at the establishment 
level. 
Besides the relevance of national conditions to the adoption of HRM practices and pay 
policies in particular, we think that this study may contribute to the existing work on pay 
setting in various ways. On the one hand, it aims at analysing the determinants of pay 
adjustments and not simply the determinants of wage levels, which have been the main 
focus of the theoretical literature on wage determination so far (see Forth and Millward, 
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2000). As regards the determinants of wage adjustments, Forth and Millward (2000) 
argue that ‘in principle, every factor that bears upon (wage) levels can also bear upon 
adjustments’. Our opinion is that, this focus on the determinants of pay settlements may 
disclose differences with respect to the analysis of wage levels. This is due to two main 
reasons. First, pay settlements are periodic revisions of wages, so their magnitude will 
depend on factors that change with a certain frequency, and not on factors that could 
bear upon the level of pay but which are constant over time or change occasionally. 
Second, pay settlements affect groups of workers and not individual employees, so we 
expect that they are dependent of factors that influence employment conditions for the 
whole group of workers affected by the settlement. Taking these two considerations into 
account, we think that a study of the determination of wage adjustments is particularly 
interesting, since we should not simply extend the analysis of wage levels to the case of 
pay settlements. On the other hand, previous work has tried to discern the factors that 
employers take into account when reviewing wages, as well as their influence on the 
size of the adjustments (see Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988; Ingram et al., 1999; Forth 
and Millward, 2000; or Brown et al., 2004). However, little effort has been made to 
explain why these factors are taken into account by employers from an institutional 
perspective.  
Our strategy consists of selecting four factors taken into account in the adjustment of 
wages: the cost of living, the ability to recruit or retain employees, the financial 
performance of the organisation and the industrial action. Then, we analyse the 
influence that the mechanism of pay determination that operates in an establishment has 
on the importance given to the aforementioned factors. Moreover, we examine the role 
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that the national context plays in the importance given to those factors when wages are 
reviewed. 
In order to carry out our research, we perform an empirical analysis using data from two 
different surveys. One of them is the well-known Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey 2004 (Department of Trade and Industry, 2005), a study on industrial relations 
and employment practices across Great Britain. The other is a newly created Spanish 
data set on human resource management (hereafter HRM) practices, which has its origin 
on a survey conducted in 2006 for a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing 
establishments. The fact that we have chosen Spain and the UK to perform our study is 
not a coincidence. Well to the contrary, we have particularly chosen to compare these 
two countries since they provide very different institutional scenarios. Their study 
constitutes a unique opportunity for evaluating the role of the national context in the pay 
setting processes. Our idea is that national idiosyncrasies contribute to maintain 
differences between countries in HRM issues and, more specifically, in pay setting 
decisions. Spain and the UK display certain features that make us expect differences in 
the factors that influence pay settlements in each country. One of these features concerns 
the regulatory framework: while Britain represents a ‘liberal market economy’ with 
scarce labour market regulation and little centralisation and co-ordination of collective 
bargaining, Spain belongs to a ‘Mediterranean’ category, showing a highly regulated 
labour market and a fragmented system of collective bargaining (see Hamman and 
Kelly, 2003). Another important consideration is that, according to the regulation 
school, the evolution of a national system can be path dependent (see Boyer, 2004; or 
Brewster et al., 2007). The “path dependency” idea refers to the fact that institution’s 
activities are constrained by their historical trajectory. Aspects such as the continuity in 
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the practices adopted by employers or their resistance to change, the historical legacy of 
the country, or the importance of the national culture could contribute to maintain inter-
country differences over time. Other circumstances such as the divergence in the 
macroeconomic indicators and the climate of industrial relations also suggest the 
importance of accounting for the national context when analysing the process of pay 
setting at the establishment level. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a theoretical 
examination of the factors that influence pay settlements. In the third section we outline 
the relationship between the mechanisms of pay determination and our factors of 
interest. Then, we depict the main features of the Spanish and British contexts in a 
comparative perspective, and we examine their expected influence on pay settlements. 
The following section focuses on the description of the data sets used to perform our 
empirical exercise. Thereafter, we concentrate on the definition of the variables used in 
the study and the presentation of the main findings. The final section highlights the main 
conclusions of the analysis.  
 
Factors that Affect Pay Determination 
 
Since our aim in this work is to test how the national context affects wage setting, we 
need to start by uncovering what the factors that influence these processes are. These 
factors can be grouped into two different categories, as proposed by Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1988). The first group includes those influences external to the establishment, 
as the competitive model of the labour market claims. According to this model, the 
determination of wages is not under the employer’s control, since they are exclusively 
 5 
determined by the demand and supply of labour. This model has proved unsatisfactory 
for explaining wage setting processes, and a number of alternative theories of pay 
determination have emerged (see Bryson and Forth, 2008). These theories point to the 
existence of an important influence on wages of plant-specific circumstances, which 
leads us to the second category of factors proposed by Blanchflower and Oswald (1988). 
Drawing on the literature on workplace wage differentials and the theories of pay 
determination, and using the available data, we will focus on four factors that influence 
wage adjustments at the establishment level: the cost of living, the ability to recruit or 
retain employees, the financial performance of the firm and the industrial action. 
Following Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) classification, we differentiate these 
variables into two groups. Hence, the cost of living constitutes an influence external to 
the establishment, whereas the financial performance and the industrial action are plant-
specific determinants of pay settlements. The ability to recruit and retain workers could 
be included in both groups, since it is shaped by the situation of the labour market as 
well as the internal conditions and management policies of the establishment. 
Why are these four factors determinant in wage-adjustment processes? First of all, the 
empirical evidence shows that most wage increases at the workplace level revolve 
around an element external to the establishment: the cost of living (see Blanchflower 
and Oswald, 1988; Ingram et al., 1999; Forth and Millward, 2000; or Brown et al., 
2004). The cost of living determines, on the one hand, the purchasing power of 
employees. On the other, it influences, to a great extent, employers’ costs and benefits 
(see Forth and Millward, 2000). However, these are not the only reasons. For example, 
employers may be prone to maintain employees’ purchasing power in order to foster 
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workplace morale; or they can take the cost of living as a reference for the evolution of 
wage levels (see Bewley, 1999).  
However, there are more factors worth considering. The efficiency wage theory provides 
theoretical support to the argument that wage changes are influenced by companies’ 
ability to recruit and retain employees. This theory recognises that wages that are above 
the market-clearing level can induce a positive effect on the effort exerted by workers. 
The implementation of a high-level wage system has additional implications for 
employers, such as the possibility of recruiting more qualified workers or the reduction 
of the turnover rate of the establishment (see Bryson and Forth, 2008). This leads us to 
think that labour needs will be undoubtedly related to employers’ pay adjustment 
decisions or negotiations.  
Rent-sharing theories back up our idea that the financial performance of the organisation 
is an important variable in wage setting processes. According to these models, if an 
organisation generates rents and their workers possess some bargaining power, they can 
negotiate with employers about rent sharing (see Groshen, 1991). Therefore, pay 
determination is the result of a distribution of workplace rents between organisational 
agents (see Blanchflower et al., 1990). 
Wage bargaining between employers and employees, or between their representatives, 
commonly creates workplace conflict due to the fact that the two groups pursue 
confronted objectives. The evolution of this bargaining process is influenced by the 
quality of the relationship between employees and managers within the workplace, 
which is known as the industrial relations climate (see Deery et al., 1999). Conflict can 
lead to industrial action, imposing great costs to the establishment.  
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Among the most relevant empirical research on the factors that determine wage 
adjustments is the above mentioned work by Blanchflower and Oswald (1988). Using 
the 1984 round of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey, the authors examined 
the responses given by personnel managers to the question what factors influenced the 
level of pay decided upon in the most recent settlement? The variables more frequently 
cited by respondents were a mix of internal and external pressures. In light of the results, 
the authors concluded that wage settlements were not only determined by external 
pressures as the competitive model of wage determination states, but also by 
organisational circumstances.  
Ingram et al. (1999) also referred to the distinction between external and internal 
pressures introduced by Blanchflower and Oswald (1988). They studied the changes 
both qualitative and quantitative observed in the factors that determined wage 
adjustments in Britain between 1979 and 1994. The authors concluded that, although the 
relevance of internal pressures had increased during the period, external factors 
continued to be determinant in the process of pay setting. 
Likewise, Forth and Millward (2000) examined the factors that shaped the size of pay 
settlements for a sample of British workplaces using information provided by the 1998 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey. Taking elements from the theories of pay 
determination, they investigated how changes both in several within-establishment 
features and in external variables affected establishments’ wage adjustments. They 
found that, despite Britain displaying low inflation rates at the moment to which the 
study refers, British employers considered inflation as an important reference variable in 
their annual wage reviews. Comparability with other workplaces, changes in the demand 
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of their products and in the supply of labour force were also important determinants of 
the size of pay settlements. 
Brown et al. (2004) used wage-settlement data at workplace level in order to investigate 
the issue of nominal wage rigidity in Britain. In particular, the authors assessed the 
degree of nominal wage rigidity in the country between 1979 and 2001, as well as the 
factors that influenced the likelihood of having zero-increase adjustments. They 
concluded that British wage settlements were characterised by being downwards rigid 
during the period, and that the rate of inflation, union status, group size and firm 
performance were related to the probability of settling wage increases at zero.  
As regards the Spanish case, we have not found any studies that empirically analyse the 
factors that employers point to as significant when adjusting their wages using survey 
data at the establishment level. However, we can gain insight into this issue through a 
reading of the existing literature regarding the analysis of wage setting processes in the 
Spanish context. Hence, Bande et al. (2008) pointed to the importance of both internal 
variables, such as labour productivity, and external variables, such as expected 
alternative income, in the process of wage setting at industry level in Spain. In their 
analysis of wage moderation in the Spanish context, Ferreiro and Gomez (2008) 
described the levels of involvement of different social agents in the establishment of 
wage setting policies, as well as the impact of these policies on the achievement of 
macroeconomic goals. Finally, Raurich et al (2009) provided evidence on the factors 
that affect wage setting in the Spanish private sector, including variables such as the 
level of employment, the real GDP and average productivity as potential determinants of 
wages 
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Therefore, we can conclude that both internal and external factors influence wage 
settlements, and that the cost of living, the ability to recruit or retain workers, the given 
establishment’s financial performance and the threat of industrial action are important 
determinants in wage adjustment processes. 
 
Mechanisms of Pay Determination 
 
Prior to examining the influence of national context on pay settlements, we briefly 
explore the impact that the mechanism of pay determination exerts on our factors of 
interest. The mechanism of pay determination that operates in a workplace establishes 
the framework in which pay decisions are taken and imposes restrictions on wage 
management by employers. In some organisations, working conditions and, particularly, 
pay policies are the result of bargaining processes between employers and workers’ 
representatives, resulting in the application of agreements that regulate the employment 
relationship. Collective bargaining can take place at different levels, and the interests 
pursued and the agreements reached may vary depending on the level at which 
negotiation takes place. 
Hence, employers and workers’ representatives can negotiate collective contracts at 
sector level. These agreements determine certain terms of the employment relationship 
such as minimum wage, job classifications or working conditions (see Gerlach and 
Stephan, 2006). Negotiations can also take place at firm or plant level, resulting in the 
establishment of a firm or plant-specific collective contract. The formalisation of this 
type of agreement implies the assumption of additional costs with respect to the 
application of a sector- level contract, but it also makes it possible for the firm or plant 
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to adapt the terms of the employment relationship to its particular conditions (see 
Gerlach and Stephan, 2006). On the other hand, there are organisations in which pay is 
set unilaterally by management or negotiated individually, following considerations that 
can be very different from those of companies covered by collective agreements. 
Previous studies on this topic have shown that the mechanism of pay determination 
influence various dimensions of pay policies, specially wage levels and wage dispersion 
(see Cardoso and Portugal, 2003; Canal Dominguez and Rodriguez Gutierrez, 2004; 
Card and de la Rica, 2006; Dell’Aringa and Pagani, 2007; and Plasman et al., 2007). 
Taking all this evidence into account, we expect pay determination arrangements to play 
a significant role in explaining the factors taken into account when adjusting wages.  
Regarding the relationship with the importance given to the cost of living, it is 
reasonable to think that, if employees have the possibility of bargaining over wage 
adjustments with their employers, they will fight for maintaining their purchasing 
power. If this is the case, then it also seems plausible that, in those establishments where 
employment conditions are ruled by collective agreements (either at the sector or plant 
level), the cost of living is going to be regarded as a more important variable than in 
those other establishments where pay is determined by some other mechanisms. 
However, this argument is not supported by efficiency wage theories, which suggest that 
considerations of cost of living are likely to be equally prominent in union and non-
union firms. This is also consistent with recent analysis of union wage mark-up in 
Britain, which has been found to be small or non-existent (see, for example, Booth and 
Bryan, 2004; and Koevoets, 2007). 
As far as the importance of the ability to recruit or retain employees is concerned, Card 
and de la Rica (2006) found that the average job tenures of workers were longer if a firm 
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collective agreement was at place. This supports the hypothesis that, since organisations 
under firm collective agreements pay a wage premium in comparison with those 
companies under national or regional agreements, voluntary turnover is lower. This is 
also related with the presence of an internal labour market, where the number of entries 
and quits is low (Baron and Kreps, 1999). Therefore, under these circumstances the firm 
is quite isolated from the labour market so that the need to attract new workers is 
reduced. At the same time, the retention of insiders is guaranteed by internal labour 
markets features (long-term employment, seniority-based pay and promotion from 
within). However, these arguments in favour of a positive effect of collective bargaining 
on the significance that the ability to recruit or retain employees has in pay settlements 
are not shared by efficiency wage theories. According to these, wages are neither purely 
determined by the market nor necessarily an outcome of power relations between 
employers and workers (Schmidt and Dworschak, 2006).  
Turning to financial performance, we predict a positive relationship between the 
importance of this factor and the setting of working conditions at the firm level, either 
by collective agreement or not. In the case of collective agreements at the firm level, 
Gerlach and Stephan (2006) point out that ‘compared to adopting an industry-level 
agreement, firm-level contracts impose additional transaction costs on management, but 
they may relax restrictions of industry-level collective agreements and adapt wages to 
firm-specific conditions’. Moreover, several studies have found the existence of a wage 
premium associated with the presence of a firm-specific contract. A commonly cited 
explanation for the presence of this premium is that it consists of company rents that 
worker representatives, having a high bargaining power, negotiate with the employer 
(see Card and de la Rica, 2006). On the other hand, when wage adjustments are set 
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unilaterally by employers or negotiated on an individual worker-employer basis, the firm 
will have a greater ability to make wages flexible so that they move together with the 
financial performance of the firm. 
Finally, we expect to find a positive relationship between the existence of collective 
bargaining and the importance given to industrial relations climate when pay is set. This 
may be due to two different reasons. On the one hand, it could be the case that collective 
bargaining pursues the establishment of harmonious employer-employee relations, and 
consequently reflects an underlying concern on the employer’s side regarding the 
importance of creating a good working environment. On the other hand, it is possible 
that collective bargaining deteriorates the climate of industrial relations and increases 
the threat of industrial action due to the conflict of interests that can emerge during the 
process of negotiation. This may result in employers using wage increases as a 
mechanism of restoring a good working environment and, consequently, being more 
concerned about the importance of industrial relations climate when setting pay (see 
Jimenez-Martin, 2006). In addition, collective bargaining is more likely to emerge in 
sectors and plants where unions are powerful and, therefore, where the threats of 
industrial action are bigger.  
Country Effects 
In order to examine the influence of the national context in the determination of 
payments, we now compare the institutional setting in Spain and the UK. Regarding this 
comparison, our aim is not to make an exhaustive analysis of institutions in the two 
countries. On the contrary, we focus on those aspects that could influence the 
importance given to the cost of living, the ability to recruit or retain employees, the 
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financial performance of the company and the industrial relations climate when wages 
are adjusted. In what follows, we revise the situation of the main macroeconomic 
indicators, the strictness of employment protection, the degree of industrial conflict and 
the different mechanisms of pay determination that characterised Spain and the UK 
during the period prior to the collection of the data sets used in our analysis.  
It is worth mentioning that the comparison between these two countries has been 
previously used in the literature since they provide clear examples of different 
institutional approaches to industrial relations. Hence, it has been found that the 
differences between the two countries influence several aspects of HRM and 
employment relations, such as trade unions’ attitudes towards the introduction of new 
work practices (see Ortiz, 1999) or the management of workplace flexibility (see Blyton 
and Martinez-Lucio, 1995). Although for different countries, other authors have also 
used these comparisons to assess the implications of the differences in the national 
framework (see for example Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998). All these studies highlight 
the usefulness of carrying out inter-country comparisons in order to examine the 
influence of national regulation and institutions on workplace issues. 
Regarding our first variable of interest, the cost of living, despite being an issue of 
major concern for governments and monetary authorities as well as a topic commonly 
revisited by academics, the impact of inflation on wage settlements is still not properly 
understood (see Brown et al., 2004). From a macroeconomic point of view, high 
inflation could help adjust real wages when nominal wages are rigid downwards (the so-
called ‘grease effect’). Alternatively, it could bring uncertainty to economic agents, 
resulting in a loss of efficiency in the wage setting processes (the ‘sand effect’).  
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Our two countries of interest display very different settings as far as inflation is 
concerned, which brings the opportunity to evaluate the influence of this factor on 
wages. In Spain, the average inflation figure between 2000-2004 was 3.3 per cent, 
whereas in Britain the average inflation figure for the same period was 1.2 per cent (see 
Table 1). From a microeconomic perspective, the cost of living is an indicator that both 
employers and employees take into account when offering or demanding wage 
increases. Linking the macro and micro dimensions of the cost of living, the dissimilar 
inflation environments observed in the countries under study raise some questions about 
its role in the wage setting behaviour of Spanish and British establishments. High 
inflation imposes uncertainty on economic agents’ decisions. If employees are supposed 
to be risk-averse, this may result in a greater importance of inflation in wage setting in 
Spain than in Britain in order to reduce the greater uncertainty caused by the persistence 
of high inflation. However, very often this problem is faced through the introduction of 
wage indexation clauses in labour contracts (see Jimenez-Martin, 1998). This is well 
reflected in the Spanish economy, where a considerable percentage of labour contracts 
usually contain such clauses. According to the European Industrial Relations 
Observatory, in 2005 wage revision clauses were included in 36.7 per cent of the 
collective agreements and covered 69 per cent of the workers (see EIRO, 2006). The 
prevalence of wage indexation in labour contracts reduces the uncertainty surrounding 
the adjustment of wages in response to changes in the cost of living. As a consequence, 
the inflation rate should be a less prominent factor in Spanish establishments when 
setting pay. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
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The ability to recruit and retain employees also exerts an impact on wage adjustment 
processes, as mentioned in the previous section. According to the turnover version of 
efficiency wages theory, looking for a new job is less costly for risk-averse workers 
when unemployment is low, which makes job mobility more likely (see Bewley, 1999). 
If we examine the unemployment figures in Spain and the UK, we observe that the 
average unemployment rate in Spain between 2000 and 2004 was 11.2 per cent, 2.5 per 
cent points above the EU25 average, whereas in the UK the average figure only reached 
the level of 5.0 per cent (see Table 1). 
Sousa-Poza and Henneberger (2004) identified another institutional feature that could be 
related to the importance given to the need to hire and retain workers at the time of 
settling pay and that deserve a detailed scrutiny. This feature is the employment 
protection legislation (EPL) of a country, which is expected to influence not only 
employees’ mobility attitudes but also employers’ hiring decisions. On the one hand, 
strict EPL provides workers with high levels of job security, which results in a low 
turnover propensity. On the other hand, the amount of employment protection regulation 
shapes the organisations’ recruitment decisions. This view is also shared by Edlund and 
Grönlund (2008).  
Our two countries of interest display important differences regarding EPL. Spain 
features a highly regulated labour market and employment protection is not an 
exception. In the UK, on the contrary, employment protection is significantly lower (see 
Morton and Siebert, 2001). According to OECD’s ranking of the strictness of 
employment legislation, in a scale ranging from 0 to 6 Spain had a score in 2003 of 3.1, 
whereas the score for the UK in that same year was 1.1 (see OECD, 2004). 
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All these facts together, we can conclude that job mobility is lower in Spain than in 
Britain due to the higher unemployment rate and the stricter EPL, which diminishes 
turnover intentions. This suggests that British firms must compete to a greater extent in 
the labour market in order to hire and retain workers. Consequently, we consider that 
they will be more prone to take into account this issue when deciding on wage increases.  
The next internal variable of interest in our study is the financial performance of the 
firm. It is possible that the importance given to this factor is influenced by the 
particularities of the pay determination arrangements that operate in British and Spanish 
organisations (see rent-sharing theories in the second section of this paper). The 
structure of collective bargaining in Spain is governed by the Constitution of 1978, 
which guarantees the right to collective bargaining between workers’ representatives 
and employers and protects the binding power of agreements. The Workers’ Statute 
constitutes the legal framework regulating collective bargaining. According to the 
Statute, all workers are entitled to elect their representatives, who bargain over working 
conditions with employers’ associations. Negotiations take place at national, industry or 
company level, but sectoral/provincial agreements are predominant. Collective 
agreements can be extended by law to non-affiliated firms or workers belonging to the 
area of negotiation (see Canal Dominguez and Rodriguez Gutierrez, 2004). As a result, 
bargaining coverage in Spain is high (see Table 1). Work councils negotiate 
employment terms at firm level, whereas the main union confederations bargain at 
higher levels. These unions also participate in firm-level negotiations, as an important 
proportion of work councils members belong to them (see Rigby et al., 2009). 
Conditions established at sector-level negotiations serve as benchmarking for firm 
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bargaining due to the mandatory extension principle, and information circulates easily 
across bargaining levels (see Jimenez-Martin, 1998). 
On the other hand, the system of industrial relations in the UK is characterised by the 
scarce legal regulation of employment relations and the voluntary character of collective 
bargaining. Collective agreements are not enforceable by law. Moreover, collective 
bargaining is highly decentralised and scarcely co-ordinated, and takes place more 
frequently at the company or plant level (see Hamann and Kelly, 2003). As for wage 
determination, the decline in collective industrial relations initiated in 1979 diminished 
the role of collective bargaining as the instrument used to set pay for employees. As a 
result, British employers have more freedom to determine wage increases without being 
restricted by a strong regulatory framework.  
All in all, we expect that the different features of the systems of pay determination in 
Britain and Spain contribute to explain the observed differences between the two 
countries. In the previous section, we concluded that establishments where wages are set 
at the firm level would give more importance to financial performance. Taking into 
consideration the particularities of pay determination in the two countries, we anticipate 
that, in British establishments the influence of the financial performance will be higher 
than in Spanish plants.  
The last relevant factor in our analysis is the industrial relations climate, which is 
frequently seen as a reference for evaluating a system of employee-employer relations. 
Wage determination processes frequently create workplace conflict, due to the fact that 
the two groups involved in these processes pursue different objectives. Workplace 
conflict may lead to industrial action, which is costly for employers. 
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Our two countries display significant differences regarding this point. Strike activity in 
Spain is important in comparison with other EU countries and pay issues seem to be the 
main reason for it (see EIRO, 2007). The processes of restructuring in traditional 
industries such as textiles, iron and steel or shipbuilding, and the existence of general 
strikes that pursue political objectives (like the one in 2002) have contributed to 
generate conflict in the Spanish workplace (see Hamann and Martinez-Lucio, 2003). As 
for Britain, the conservative government imposed strong restrictions on union 
organisation and on industrial action as a mechanism of defence of the terms and 
conditions of employment. Moreover, compulsory unionism was outlawed during the 
period. Afterwards, the New Labour government maintained the restrictions to strike 
activity introduced by its predecessors. As a result, the UK has gone from being a 
country with important industrial disputes to one with moderate industrial action (see 
Scheuer, 2006). According to the International Labour Organization, in the UK only 8 
working days were lost per 1000 workers due to strikes and lockouts in 2004. In Spain, 
this figure amounts to 116.9 days lost per 1000 workers in 2006. As it is shown in Table 
1, the number of strikes and lockouts is dramatically higher in Spain in comparison with 
the British figure. 
There is no doubt that international reports present Spain as a country with one of the 
worst records in Europe as far as industrial conflict is concerned (Rigby and Marco-
Aledo, 2001). Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that when setting pay, Spanish 
establishments will be more concerned about industrial action than establishments in the 
UK.  
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Data Description 
 
Our analysis is based on data from two sources. The first one is a Spanish data set 
collected in 2006 as part of a survey on HRM in the Spanish manufacturing industry. 
This data was gathered in 2006 through personal interviews with managers in 
manufacturing establishments with 50 or more employees, and represents a unique 
source of information about management practices in Spanish plants. Most of the 
information on HRM refers exclusively to blue-collar workers, that is, those workers 
involved directly in the production process. The reason for restricting the analysis to this 
category of employees lies on the existence of diverse internal labour markets with 
different features within the same organisation. Limiting the study to manual workers 
facilitates comparisons across establishments. The universe of potential respondents for 
the purposes of the project was constituted for all Spanish manufacturing establishments 
with fifty or more employees in 2005, which amounts to 6.971 units. The aim was to 
obtain a sample of one thousand units, in order to get conclusions that could be 
extended to the entire Spanish manufacturing industry. After stratification by sector, size 
and location, a random selection of workplaces was obtained from the Spanish Central 
Directory of Firms (Directorio Central de Empresas, DIRCE) of the Spanish National 
Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE), using data from 2005. The 
final sample is constituted by a total of 1003 Spanish manufacturing plants. 
The British data was obtained from the WERS 2004, the fifth round of a series of 
surveys that have mapped industrial relations and employment practices in Great Britain 
since 1980. The survey collects information from managers with responsibility for 
employment relations or personnel matters, trade unions or employee representatives 
and employees themselves. It covers both private and public sectors and almost all 
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industry sectors. Analogously with the Spanish survey, the unit of analysis is the 
workplace or establishment. For the purposes of this study, information was taken from 
one of the WERS 2004 sources, the Cross-Section Management Questionnaire. The 
main element of this survey was an interview with the senior manager at the workplace 
with a day-to-day responsibility for employment relations (see Kersley et al., 2006 for 
more information on the WERS 2004). 
Finally it is worth mentioning that, in order to be able to compare plants with similar 
characteristics in both countries, for the British sample we only used those 
establishments belonging to the manufacturing sector and with 50 or more employees. 
Moreover, information on the mechanism of pay determination and the factors that 
influenced pay settlements for British establishments referred to the largest occupational 
group. In the Spanish case, this data was collected for manual workers, so we selected 
only those British cases in which the largest occupational group matched the definition 
of manual worker used in the Spanish questionnaire. We constructed a unique data set 
with only those establishments that were perfectly comparable. Finally, following Forth 
and Millward (2000), we chose from this sample those plants in which wages increases 
had taken place, as it happens in the Spanish sample. Hence, the final sample is 
constituted by 892 cases, 182 coming from the British survey and 710 from the Spanish 
one. 
Variables 
 
In what follows we describe the variables used in the empirical analysis. Their means, 
standard deviations and definitions are presented in Table 2.  
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
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Both the Spanish and British questionnaires provide information on the factors that 
influenced pay settlements in the establishments surveyed. The four factors considered 
are Changes in the cost of living, Ability to recruit or retain employees, Financial 
performance of the organisation and Industrial action threatened or taken. In the 
Spanish questionnaire, respondents were required to value the importance given to these 
factors when determining pay in a scale ranging from 0 (not important) to 10 (very 
important). In the British survey, managers were asked if the factors mentioned above 
influenced or not the size of pay settlements or reviews. In order to merge the 
information from both data sets, it was necessary to recode the Spanish scale variables 
into dichotomous variables. Therefore, we created new dependent variables using the 
following re-codification: when the response given is five or more, our dependent 
dummy variable takes value one, being zero otherwise.1 
In order to address the issue of the influence that the country’s idiosyncratic issues may 
have in the determination of pay a dummy variable that takes value one for British 
establishments and zero for Spanish ones has been used. 
We also introduce in our analysis three dummy variables that state whether pay 
conditions at the establishment are settled through a collective bargaining at the plant or 
firm level, through a sector-level bargaining or by some other method. The last category 
includes any mechanism of pay determination different from a collective agreement at 
sector, firm or plant level, i.e. it includes: pay set by management at the workplace or at 
a higher level in the organisation, individual bargaining with employees and other 
mechanisms such as the use of an independent pay review body in Britain. This category 
is the omitted one in the empirical analysis.  
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Moreover, we include several control variables. Size is captured by the logarithm of the 
number of employees in the establishment and Age by the logarithm of the number of 
years since foundation of the plant. Finally, Multinational takes value one if the firm 
belongs to a multinational group and zero otherwise. Finally, the Workforce 
representation variable is included. In the British case, this variable captures the 
existence of union recognition and, in the Spanish case, whether or not there is a legally-
based employee representative structure, such as a work council. 
 
Results 
Since the dependent variables are dichotomous, we performed logit model estimations. 
For each of the dependent variables we have estimated four models. In the first one, we 
have included as explanatory variables the controls as well as the two dummy variables 
on collective bargaining. The second model includes control variables and the country 
dummy variable. The third model incorporates the controls, the collective bargaining 
variables and the country dummy. Finally, and in order to account for the possibility that 
the mechanisms of pay determination have different effects in the two countries under 
study, the fourth model includes interaction terms between collective bargaining 
variables and the country dummy. 
We would like to start with the results obtained with regard to the importance given to 
the cost of living when adjusting wages (Table 3). In the first model we can see that in 
those workplaces where collective bargaining takes place at the firm or plant level 
inflation is more taken into account. The second model shows that the country variable 
does not exert any influence on the importance given to the cost of living. The third 
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model confirms the results of the first model concerning firm-level collective 
bargaining. Model four shows that the interaction terms are not statistically significant, 
which suggests that the positive effect of collective bargaining at the firm level on the 
importance given to the cost of living in pay setting is the same for the two countries. 
Our interpretation of these results is the following. In previous sections we hypothesised 
that employees pursue wage rises that maintain their purchasing power in their 
collective negotiations with employers. Although we observe that inflation is considered 
a more important factor in pay settlements when a firm-level agreement is bargained, 
this result does not emerge in the case of an agreement at the sector level. In other 
words, the employees’ capacity to maintain their purchasing power under a contract 
negotiated at the sector level seems to be lower than we expected. This finding may be 
related to the claim that firm-specific contracts are agreed in those establishments where 
workers’ representatives are powerful (see Dell’ Aringa and Pagani, 2007). Then, 
employees in those establishments can exert more pressure on the employer to get wage 
increases that keep pace with the cost of living in comparison with workers covered by 
sector agreements. Despite the existence of wage indexation clauses in Spanish labour 
contracts, we do not observe a lower concern about the cost of living in Spanish 
establishments. This result is consistent with previous empirical analyses finding that 
most pay settlements reflect inflation to some extent, both under strict and flexible 
regulatory conditions, and in periods of high and low inflation (see Ingram et al., 1999; 
and Brown et al., 2004). 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
The analysis of the importance given to the ability to recruit and retain employees also 
reveals interesting findings (Table 4). In the first model we find that plants where 
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collective bargaining is the main mechanism of pay determination give more importance 
to the need to attract and retain workers. The effect is slightly larger for sector-level 
collective agreements than for collective agreements at the plant or firm level. The 
second model displays a negative and highly significant impact of the Britain dummy 
variable. The third model supports this country effect. However, the collective 
bargaining effect disappears, what suggests that country differences have to do with 
factors not related to the mechanisms of pay determination. This result contradicts our 
idea that, under a firm collective agreement, the employer gives less importance to 
recruitment and retention issues due to the wage premium associated with this type of 
agreement that reduces turnover (see Card and de la Rica, 2006). This outcome could be 
justified in the context of the efficiency wages theory, which arguments that wages may 
not be the result of power relations between employers and workers (see Schmidt and 
Dworschak, 2006). Hence, it seems that the importance given to the need to recruit and 
retain workers on pay settlements depends on factors other than the level at which 
collective agreements are negotiated. In the last model, when interaction terms are 
included, we observe a negative and significant effect of the interaction between the 
country dummy and the presence of a sector-level collective agreement. This means that 
there is a negative impact of collective bargaining on the importance given to the need 
to recruit and retain employees at this level, but only in Britain. The country dummy 
does not emerge as a significant determinant of our dependent variable in this model. 
Consequently, our idea that the differences in the unemployment figures and the 
protection of employment between Spain and the UK influence the relative importance 
of the need to recruit and retain workers is not supported by the findings.  
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
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As far as the importance of the financial performance of the organisation when adjusting 
wages, significant results emerge (Table 5). The first model indicates that the collective 
bargaining variables do not exert any significant influence on this factor. The model 
including the country variable clearly shows that British establishments have a higher 
probability of considering their financial performance when setting wages as compared 
to Spanish ones. In the third model both the Britain variable and the firm-level 
collective bargaining have positive and significant coefficients. This suggests that the 
differences between Britain and Spain around this issue are only partially explained by 
the dissimilarities in collective bargaining institutions incidence. On the one hand, those 
workplaces covered by their own agreement give more importance to the financial 
performance at the time of setting wages. As Gerlach and Stephan (2006) state, firm 
level agreements allow employers to adapt wages to their particular circumstances. This 
result may also be due to the existence of company rents that are shared with the 
employees due to their bargaining power (see Card and de la Rica, 2006). The findings 
indicate that the probability to link wages to firm performance is higher in those 
establishments that negotiate a firm agreement than in the plants with an alternative 
mechanism of pay determination, such as the employers’ unilateral setting of working 
conditions or the bargaining at an individual level. On the other hand, other features of 
the national context exert an influence of the importance given to the factor of interest. 
In particular, our hypothesis is that the existence of a more flexible regulatory 
framework in the UK facilitates that employers take into account the results of the 
organisation when they adjust wages. The interaction terms included in the fourth model 
do not emerge as significant in the estimation; therefore, collective bargaining has the 
same effect in both countries. 
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[TABLE 5 HERE] 
In Table 6, the importance of industrial relations is analysed. The first model shows that 
this importance is related to the existence of any type of collective agreement, whether 
at the plant or sector level. Moreover, the Britain dummy has a large negative and highly 
significant effect in the second model. The third model confirms the results of these two 
models. This indicates that part of the country effect is associated to differences in pay 
determination mechanisms, whereas at the same time there is another important part that 
could be explained by some of the factors mentioned above in the paper. As far as the 
positive influence exerted by the collective bargaining variables is concerned, we 
suggest two plausible explanations. First, it is possible that collective bargaining occurs 
in those establishments where there is a concern about keeping a good climate of 
industrial relations, and this concern is taken into account by the employer when 
adjusting wages. Second, it could be the case that collective bargaining deteriorates 
employment relations, so that the employer increases wages in order to create a better 
working environment and avoid the threat of industrial action (see Jimenez-Martin, 
2006). Regarding other aspects of the national context, the fact that Britain displays 
moderate industrial action in comparison with Spain could explain the negative 
coefficient of the country dummy. Finally, in the fourth model the interaction terms 
between the collective bargaining variables and the country dummy do not show 
significant coefficients. 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
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Conclusions  
This paper attempts to provide a more detailed account of the role that the national 
context and collective bargaining play in the determination of pay settlements. In 
particular, we analyse their influence on the importance given to the following factors at 
the moment of adjusting wages: the cost of living, the ability to recruit and retain 
employees, the financial performance of the firm and the threat of industrial action. The 
empirical analysis is performed for a sample of manufacturing establishments in Britain 
and Spain, focusing on manual workers. The UK displays low regulation of the labour 
market and industrial relations, whereas Spain has one of the most regulated systems in 
the world. Consequently, the comparison of these particular countries allows us to 
examine the influence of the national context on wage adjustments at the establishment 
level. 
Several interesting findings have emerged from our analysis. A first general conclusion 
is that the mechanisms of pay determination play a major role in explaining the factors 
behind wage settlements. In spite of their institutional differences, the effects do not 
seem to vary between the two countries considered. Only one of the interaction terms 
included in the estimations appears as a significant determinant of the factors considered 
in pay settlements. 
More specifically, firm-level collective bargaining is associated with a greater 
importance of cost of living. This result indicates that, under a firm-level collective 
agreement, workers have a higher power to negotiate wage increases that mantain their 
living standard. However, and contrary to our predictions, employees’ capacity to 
maintain their purchasing power seems to be lower under a contract at the sector level. 
In addition, those establishments covered by a firm collective agreement are more 
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concerned about the financial performance of the organisation. As we have previously 
stated, this finding may be explained as a higher freedom of the employer to adapt wage 
outcomes to the conditions of the organisation. Alternatively, it could be due to the 
existence of a wage premium associated with this type of contract. Moreover, collective 
bargaining at whichever level is linked with more consideration of industrial action in 
pay review decisions. Either the setting of more harmonious employment relations 
under collective bargaining, or the need to restore a good industrial relations climate 
through wage increases, are plausible explanations of this result. On the contrary, 
differences in the mechanisms of pay determination do not seem to play any role in 
explaining the consideration of the need to attract and retain employees.  
Several conclusions can be extracted from the analysis of the wage setting mechanisms. 
Firstly, the results concerning the cost of living correctly reflect the problems that 
decentralised bargaining has usually involved for wage moderation in Spain. They show 
that individual employers cannot control costs in this bargaining context. This is the 
reason why government and businesses, in conjunction with unions, have shown interest 
in national bargaining as a way to achieve the macroeconomic goal of low inflation 
(Royo, 2007).  
Secondly, our results have implications for the debate on the effect of collective 
bargaining on wage dispersion. Theoretically, this is expected to be higher under single-
employer collective agreements, since they may increase inter-firm wage differentials by 
giving firms more leeway in taking into account and adapting to firm-specific 
characteristics and conditions (Dell’ Aringa and Pagani, 2007). Nonetheless, it has also 
been suggested that inter-firm wage differences in Spain and Anglo-Saxon countries 
may be lower under firm-level agreements because of union desire for standardisation 
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(Plasman et al., 2007). We have found that, when adjusting wages, the mechanism of 
pay determination matters. The differences in the importance of the criteria considered 
most likely will lead to differences in wage levels across firms. This can be seen 
especially clearly in the importance of financial performance for pay setting in firm-
level bargaining: differences in performance across firms should be translated into 
differences in wages between firms.  
Another interesting result is the similarity between sector-level collective bargaining 
and pay settlement not based in collective bargaining. The differences only emerge in 
relation to the influence of industrial action. This general pattern fits well with the 
observations made by Schmidt and Dworschak (2006) regarding mimetic wages. In their 
paper, they state that isomorphism and pay benchmarking in non-bargaining contexts act 
as a substitute for sector agreements, leading to similarities in pay movements. Whereas 
they found this effect for the UK, our study suggests it is also true of Spain. 
Another fact to be underlined is that differences in the extension of single-employer and 
multi-employer bargaining between the two countries only capture a small part of the 
country effect. When significant, the coefficient of the country dummy variable remains 
so even when we include the collective bargaining dummies. Therefore, other factors 
must account for the differences in pay setting criteria. Unfortunately, the analysis of 
samples from two countries at a single moment in time makes it impossible to give 
precise details on the factors that cause these differences. To determine quantitatively 
whether these are differences in employment protection, macroeconomic circumstances, 
union power, co-ordination in bargaining or any other factor would involve analysing as 
many countries as possible in as many moments in time.  
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We find that when wage adjusting processes are in place, Britain gives more importance 
to the financial performance of the firm, whereas Spain takes industrial action into 
account to a greater extent. The first result supports our prediction that British 
employers have more freedom to link wage adjustments to their performance due to the 
existence of a more flexible regulatory framework. Regarding the importance given to 
the climate of industrial relations in Spain, the result is consistent with the industrial 
action figures and the incidence of industrial conflict that characterise this country. In 
addition, these results are in line with previous empirical evidence for the UK. For 
example, they are congruent with the small proportion of British firms that according to 
Ingram et al. (1999) cite industrial action threatened or taken as an influential factor on 
wage increases.  
The little consideration of the financial performance of the firm in pay review processes 
in Spain indicates that, in spite of the efforts made, the pegging of wages to productivity 
is still a goal to be achieved (Molina-Romo, 2005). This lack of flexibility in pay 
settlements has made employers search for flexibility through the high use of contingent 
work. This, however, leads to poor labour market outcomes such as high unemployment 
and excessive temporary work. A recent example of this situation can be clearly 
observed in the 2008-2010 economic crises. In this period not only have Spanish wages 
not gone down, even though the economy has required such adjustment, but also 
unemployment has abruptly increased.  
We also consider that, albeit not so clearly, the findings regarding the inflation rate are 
also coherent with previous studies. Ingram et al. (1999) and Forth and Millward (2000) 
found that inflation is a major influence on pay settlements. In spite of the fact that the 
country variable is not significant, we must not forget that the comparison is made with 
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Spain. This country has one of the highest inflation rates in the European Union and, 
therefore, represents a context where inflation is expected to play a major role in wage 
adjustments. The fact that Britain does not show differences with Spain in this regard 
seems to confirm the substantial importance of inflation in pay settlements, as has been 
previously concluded. Despite our expectation that differences in the unemployment rate 
and EPL would lead to a higher importance of the need to recruit and retain workers in 
Britain, the analysis does not confirm this idea. On the contrary, the regressions reveal 
that the mechanisms of pay determination have different effects on the factor of interest 
in the two countries under study. In particular, we observe a negative incidence of 
sector-level collective bargaining on the importance given to the need to recruit and 
retain workers in Britain. All in all, our results provide general support for the influence 
of national context and collective bargaining on pay settlements. The particularities of a 
country, such as the regulatory framework concerning the labour market and 
employment relations and the dependency of institutions on their historical trajectory, 
could be behind the differences in the factors that influence wage adjustments. Clearly, 
further research on these issues is required in order to properly explain the nature of 
these relationships, and there is still much to learn about the influence of national 
idiosyncrasies on pay settlement at review processes. Notwithstanding, we believe that 
this piece of research is a good starting point, since our results give evidence in favour 
of the idea that national institutions matter when it comes to pay decisions.  
We hope that future work could contribute to improve the understanding of how wages 
are determined, since they constitute a primary concern for both employers and workers. 
Moreover, the analysis of how wage adjustments are performed and how the national 
context influences their formation provides valuable information that could eventually 
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help to design specific labour market policies. These policies could contribute to reach 
some desired macroeconomic goals, such as the reduction of wage inequality or the rate 
of unemployment.  
Obviously, our work is subject to the usual limitations related to the use of cross-
sectional data. In these cases, causality relationships can not be proved. Further, we have 
used data from two different surveys, applying different data collection methodologies 
or, in some minor cases, measuring variables on different scales. However, it should be 
noted that homogeneous samples from Britain and Spain regarding sector and 
occupation have been considered in our empirical analyses. This mitigates to a great 
extent the potential problems derived from the use of different data sets. An additional 
limitation associated with our study concerns the factors included as determinants of 
wage adjustments. Certainly, other variables may also impinge an effect on pay 
settlements. This is the case of the previous wage level of the establishment. 
Unfortunately, our data sets do not allow the formulation of a dynamic model of wage 
formation since they do not provide information about the previous wage level as a 
factor that employers may take into account when adjusting their wages. Future research 
on the topic should account for the process of inertia in pay settlements and use 
longitudinal instead of cross section data in order to construct a dynamic model of wage 
adjustment. 
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Notes 
 
1. This is not the only possible re-codification of the Spanish scale variables. We performed the 
estimations using two other transformations of the variables (six to ten on original scale takes 
value one in dummy variable, and two to ten on original scale takes value one in dummy 
variable), and the differences in the results were negligible. Eventually, we opt for the first 
recodification as we considered it to be the most consistent with the dichotomous measures of 
the dependent variables. 
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Table 1. Country Differences in Main Indicators 
 SPAIN UK EU25 
Unemployment rate (Average 2000-2004)1 11.2% 5.0% 8.7% 
Inflation (Average 2000-2004) 1 3.3% 1.2% 2.2% 
Employment Legislation Strictness2 3.1 1.1 n.a. 
Collective Bargaining Coverage1 81% 35% 66% 
Degree of Bargaining Centralisation1 38 13 34 
Strikes and Lockouts in manufacturing3 359 30 n.a. 
Working Days Lost per 1000 Workers in manufacturing3 116.9 8 n.a. 
 Notes: 1Source: EIRO (2007) 
           2Source: OECD (2004) 
          3Source: ILO Laborsta. 2006 for Spain and 2004 for UK 
              n.a: Figure not available 
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Table 2. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Definition Total  
Sample 
Spanish 
Sample 
British  
Sample 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Inflation 
Dummy variable: 1 if changes in the cost of living 
influence pay settlements, 0 otherwise 
0.842 0.365 0.850 0.358 0.810 0.393 
Recruitment Dummy variable: 1 if the ability to recruit or retain 
employees influence pay settlements, 0 otherwise 
0.562 0.496 0.605 0.489 0.400 0.491 
Performance Dummy variable: 1 if the financial performance of 
the organisation influence pay settlements, 0 
otherwise 
0.734 0.442 0.703 0.457 0.854 0.354 
Climate Dummy variable: 1 if industrial action threatened or 
taken influence pay settlements, 0 otherwise 
0.626 0.484 0.777 0.417 0.050 0.218 
Sector-level collective  
bargaining 
Dummy variable: 1 if pay set by collective 
bargaining at sector level, 0 otherwise 
0.399 0.490 0.484 0.500 0.071 0.258 
Plant-level collective  
bargaining 
Dummy variable: 1 if pay set by collective 
bargaining at organisation or plant level, 0 otherwise 
0.497 0.500 0.505 0.500 0.467 0.500 
Anther mechanism of 
pay determination 
Dummy variable: 1 if pay set some other way, 0 
otherwise (reference category) 
0.104 0.305 0.011 0.106 0.461 0.500 
Britain Dummy variable: 1 if British establishment, 0 
otherwise 
0.204 0.403     
Size Number of employees (natural log) 5.016 0.925 4.840 0.814 5.701 1.011 
Age 
Age of the establishment, in years  (natural log) 3.401 0.765 3.373 0.711 3.537 0.935 
Multinational Dummy variable: 1 if the plant belongs to a foreign-
owned firm, 0 otherwise 
0.267 0.443 0.230 0.421 0.416 0.494 
Workforce 
representation 
Dummy variable: 1 if there is union recognition for 
the British sample or a legally-based representative 
structure for the Spanish sample, 0 otherwise 
0.863 0.344 0.923 0.268 0.632 0.484 
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Table 3. Consideration in pay settlements of the cost of living  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.390 
(0.691) 
0.376 
(0.638) 
0.464 
(0.697) 
1.086 
(1.261) 
Size  -0.054 
(0.115) 
0.063 
(0.119) 
-0.025 
(0.122) 
-0.046 
(0.123) 
Age  0.234* 
(0.124) 
0.221* 
(0.123) 
0.236* 
(0.123) 
0.253** 
(0.125) 
Multinational 0.471* 
(0.248) 
0.536** 
(0.248) 
0.485* 
(0.249) 
0.460* 
(0.250) 
Workforce representation 0.075 
(0.313) 
0.261 
(0.279) 
0.050 
(0.316) 
0.028 
(0.320) 
Sector-level collective bargaining 0.362 
(0.347) 
 0.172 
(0.441) 
-0.349 
(1.084) 
Firm-level collective bargaining  1.041*** 
(0.351) 
 0.875** 
(0.423) 
0.263 
(1.089) 
Britain  -0.401 
(0.272) 
-0.249 
(0.354) 
-0.839 
(1.113) 
Britain x Sector-level collective bargaining    -0.123 
(1.283) 
Britain x Firm-level collective bargaining    0.992 
(1.197) 
Chi-squared 26.807*** 14.464** 27.291*** 29.634*** 
% correct predictions 84.4 84.4 84.4 84.4 
N 
850 855 850 850 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses  
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Table 4. Consideration in pay settlements of the need to attract and retain employees  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 1.529*** 
(0.526) 
1.914*** 
(0.497) 
1.739*** 
(0.535) 
0.798 
(0.904) 
Size  -0.153* 
(0.082) 
-0.059 
(0.086) 
-0.045 
(0.088) 
-0.046 
(0.088) 
Age  -0.114 
(0.095) 
-0.101 
(0.096) 
-0.096 
(0.096) 
-0.082 
(0.096) 
Multinational -0.449*** 
(0.165) 
-0.404** 
(0.166) 
-0.398** 
(0.167) 
-0.400** 
(0.168) 
Workforce representation -0.811*** 
(0.277) 
-0.823*** 
(0.246) 
-0.936*** 
(0.284) 
-0.881*** 
(0.284) 
Sector-level collective bargaining 0.918*** 
(0.307) 
 0.275 
(0.357) 
1.153 
(0.761) 
Firm-level collective bargaining  0.702** 
(0.299) 
 0.134 
(0.341) 
0.979 
(0.760) 
Britain  -0.951*** 
(0.214) 
-0.891*** 
(0.248) 
0.082 
(0.795) 
Britain x Sector-level collective bargaining    -1.761* 
(1.042) 
Britain x Firm-level collective bargaining    -0.943 
(0.836) 
Chi-squared 39.709*** 50.593*** 53.058*** 56.142*** 
% correct predictions 60.1 60.5 61.2 61.2 
N 
848 853 848 848 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses  
 
 41 
Table 5. Consideration in pay settlements of financial performance of the plant  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.743 
(0.601) 
0.431 
(0.550) 
0.432 
(0.625) 
0.569 
(0.929) 
Size  0.104 
(0.095) 
0.074 
(0.098) 
0.004 
(0.101) 
-0.015 
(0.102) 
Age  0.078 
(0.105) 
0.060 
(0.107) 
0.064 
(0.108) 
0.087 
(0.109) 
Multinational -0.260 
(0.185) 
-0.258 
(0.185) 
-0.313* 
(0.187) 
-0.335* 
(0.188) 
Workforce representation -0.320 
(0.292) 
-0.071 
(0.269) 
-0.220 
(0.293) 
-0.225 
(0.296) 
Sector-level collective bargaining -0.553 
(0.339) 
 0.173 
(0.416) 
0.090 
(0.747) 
Firm-level collective bargaining  0.150 
(0.338) 
 0.808** 
(0.406) 
0.646 
(0.748) 
Britain  0.834*** 
(0.261) 
0.985*** 
(0.327) 
0.856 
(0.801) 
Britain x Sector-level collective bargaining    -1.039 
(0.994) 
Britain x Firm-level collective bargaining    0.655 
(0.917) 
Chi-squared 25.431*** 19.388*** 35.630*** 40.701*** 
% correct predictions 73.2 73.4 73.2 73.2 
N 
848 853 848 848 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses  
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Table 6. Consideration in pay settlements of industrial action threatened or taken  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.251 
(0.670) 
1.651*** 
(0.636) 
0.786 
(0.802) 
1.406 
(0.985) 
Size  -0.520*** 
(0.091) 
-0.088 
(0.111) 
-0.138 
(0.112) 
-0.142 
(0.111) 
Age  -0.065 
(0.109) 
0.027 
(0.125) 
0.034 
(0.126) 
0.029 
(0.126) 
Multinational -0.316* 
(0.182) 
-0.095 
(0.214) 
-0.105 
(0.215) 
-0.113 
(0.214) 
Workforce representation 0.162 
(0.309) 
-0.054 
(0.329) 
-0.287 
(0.367) 
-0.356 
(0.380) 
Sector-level collective bargaining 
3.335*** 
(0.481) 
 1.136** 
(0.570) 
0.609 
(0.750) 
Firm-level collective bargaining  3.364*** 
(0.478) 
 1.512*** 
(0.564) 
0.977 
(0.752) 
Britain  -4.105*** 
(0.383) 
-3.753*** 
(0.397) 
-5.045*** 
(1.265) 
Britain x Sector-level collective bargaining    1.542 
(1.644) 
Britain x Firm-level collective bargaining    1.450 
(1.331) 
Chi-squared 190.636*** 339.023*** 347.098*** 348.523*** 
% correct predictions 73.8 81.2 81.2 81.1 
N 
850 855 850 850 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
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